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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
1.1.1. Reliability Goals for Flight.Critical SoRware
Examplesof digitalcomputersbeing used in increasinglycritical functions in flight
management systems are the navigation, guidance, and energy management system for
the Boeing 757/7671,2 commercial jet transport series, the slat and flap control system
for the Airbus Industries A310,3 and the flight control system for the Grumman X29A. 4
Since software failures can be equally as hazardous as hardwarc failures, the use of
software to perform critical functions of these flight management systems necessitates
demonstrating that the flight management software complies with Part 25 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations. Toward this end, DO-178, published by thc Radio and Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 5 provides guidance on techniques and methods
that may be used for building and certifying reliable flight control software. The FAA
Advisory Circular 25.1309-1 6 which references DO-178 def'mes the software reliability
requirements by specifying three overlapping quantitative ranges which arc to be inter-
preted as the allowable risk for an hour of flight time based on a flight of mean duration
for the type of airplane being certified. These ranges are associated with the frequency
with which failure events may be expected to occur several times during the operational
life of each airplane (i.e., probable events that occur with a probability on the order of
1 x 10-5or greater). The failure events may not be expected to occur during the total
operational lifc of a random single airplane of a particular type but may be expected to
occur during the total operational life of all airplanes of a particular type (i.e., improb-
able events that occur with a probability on the order of I x 10-5 or less ). These failure
events are so unlikely that they need not be considered to occur ever unless engineering
judgement would require their consideration (i.e., extremely improbable events that
occur with a probability on the order of 1 x 10-9or less).
1.1.2. NASA-LaRC Software Reliability Research Goals
The software reliability research sponsored by NASA-LaRC focuses on the develop-
ment of a credible method for predicting operational reliability- that is, predicting the
improbability that the system will fail duc to residual faults remaining in the software. 7
It is these residual faults, which surface infrequently, that cause the rare event or
extremely improbable failures. As evidenced by the first well-publicized Space Shuttle
software bug, the failure of the initialization logic in J. Garman's words resulted from a
"very small, very improbable, very intricate, and a very old mistake.''8 This bug typifies
the rare and convoluted combination of events which cause carefully developed software
to fail.
Althoughconsideringall faults is importantin reliabilityprediction,the most prob-
able faults are often eliminatedusing the softwarequalityassurancemethodsdescribed
in RTCADO-178. Theresearchthus concentrateson the developmentof a method
which yieldsquantitativeassurancethat the aggregateprobabilityof the remaining,less
probable faults, constitutes an acceptable risk. Accordingly, the System Validation
°-
Branch of NASA - Langley Research Center has used a probability value of 10-9 for a
ten hour flight as an informal standard in the construction of a credible reliability predic-
tion method for validating critical software.9 To date no known software has been vali-
dated to that extent.
1.2. Study Objectives
The construction of a credible reliability prediction method for critical software is
hindered by our lack of knowledge about the underlying nature of the software failure
process. This lack of knowledge contributes to our inability to eradicate or tolerate faults
and to our lack of confidence in the extent to which we have al_[_roximatedthe goal of
minimal defects, i.e., achieving a reliability of less than I x 10-_ for a ten hour flight.
The study was undertaken to provide data for use in developing a model for predicting
the reliability of software in systems with feedback, namely flight control. In particular,
we were interested in the software error burst phenomenon 10 and in gauging the effect
of these bursts on the behavior of the system. A software error burst is a sequence of
observations of erroneous outputs which are repeated manifestations of latent software
faults that due to the memory of the system and the correlated nature of the inputs can
eventually lead to a system failure. The frequency and duration of these bursts may
severely effect the operational reliability of process control software, and consequently
may be a critical reliability prediction parameter.
1.3. Related Work
The flight control software tested as a part of this study was developed in a manner
which emulated a realistic software development effort. It was developed in a software
research and development laboratory at RTI by three moderate to advanced skill level
programmers using a remote link to the computational facilities of NASA's AIRLAB at
Langley Research Center. Each of the programmers was given two programming tasks
which involved implementing a launch interceptor condition module for a radar tracking
system and a pitch axis module for a PA28 flight control system. The specifications for
both modules had been written in English by a senior analyst who had also written and
extensively tested a fourth or comparison version of each application. The programming
activity was managed in a conventional fashion with the exception that the programmers
were not permitted to discuss their code with anyone other than their manager or the
senior analyst who was responsible for answering all specification questions. The pro-
grammers were instructed to optimize the reliability of their code. Additional informa-
tion about the software dcvelol:rmcnt activity can be found in NASA CR-172553, An
Experiment in Software Reliability. 11
1.4. Summary of Study and Conclusions
The development and testing of the pitch axis control module for a flight control
system was undertaken to provide data for use in constructing a model for predicting the
reliability of software in systems with feedback. In particular, the study was undertaken
to investigate the software error burst phenomenon10 and to gauge the effect of these
bursts on system behavior. A software error burst is a sequence of erroneous outputs
due to the memory of the system and a correlated nature of the inputs. The frequency
and duration of these bursts may severely effect the operational reliability of process
control software and, consequently, may be a significant reliabilityprediction parameter.
To investigate the software error burst phenomenon, three pitch axis control
modules were implemented for a PA28 aircraft. Input to the control law modules are
the pitch command and the current pitch of the aircrrfft. Output from the control law is
the elevator deflection command. The specification,written in English and provided to
the programmers for coding, contained three operating modes of increasing complexity.
A one axis, single input, single output simulation of the aircraft comprised the PA28 air-
craft response model.
The three implementations were tested in parallel with over 14 million pitch com-
mands (about 78,000 flight hours) having varying levels of additive input and feedback
noise. This testing surfaced four software faults in an implementationof the pitch axis
control law. This small number of detected faults may be due to the overly simpleexam-
ple chosen for the control law software and the programmer's ability to exploit this sim-
plicity in validating it. As software components of the flight control systems increase in
functionality and complexity, the full impUtation of software errors remains to be seen.
2. THE SYSTEM UNDERSTUDY
2.1. The PA28 Pitch Axis Control Module
A survey of flight control software systems 12,13,14,1,4,15,16,17,2,3which could be
used for this study culminated with the decision to select a system for which we had both
the control laws and a description of the aircraft response model. As a result, the PA28
aircraft was chosen because its aircraft response model was known and relatively simple
to code. The pitch axis control module was chosen as reliable control of the pitch axis is
safety-critical during landing. Loss of control of the elevator during final approach wiU
almost certainly result in a catastrophic accident. The pitch axis control law is typically
computed first and used as input to the control laws for the longitudinal,axes, although,
in a few flight control systems it is computed in parallel with the roll axis.
Appendix A contains the specification of the pitch axis control law provided to the
three programmers for independent development. The specification requires that the
pitch axis control law operate in nine modes. The modes correspond to the use of Pro-
portional (P), Proportional/Derivative (PD), and Proportional/Integral/Derivative (PID)
control strategies and to different computations of the error term. A fourth module was
developed and extensively tested for use as a comparator. The pitch axis module speci-
fied constitutes a simplified pitch axis control system as it ignores voting to handle sen-
sor failures and couplingwith an analog backup system.
3
2.2. ThePA28AircraftPitchAxisResponseModel
A single input-singleoutput aircraftresponsemodel def'mesthe PA28 aircraft's
responseabout the pitch axis. It wasdef'medin the frequencydomainand implemented
in the time domainusingTustin's approximation. In the frequencydomain, the aircraft
responsein pitchis givenby the followingtransferfunction
otlS 2 + ct2S + ot3
-_(s) _31s4+ 132s3+ t33s2+ 134s+ a_
and the aircraft response in pitch rate is given by
8_r 50
An elevator transfer function of the form --_-(s) = s (s+50) ' is used.
where
OA is the aircraft response in pitch.
0A is the aircraft response in pitch.
8N is the elevator deflection for the N-version system after voting and prior to
the application of the elevator transfer function.
8_ is the elevator deflection for the N-version system after the application of
the elevator transfer function.
_1 , _2 , Or3
and
' _1 , _2., f13, _4, flS" are model coefficients
and
s is the Laplace domain variable.
3. TEST PROCEDURE AND RESULTS
3.1. Configuration of the N-VERSION CONTROLLER
The three independently developed software implementations of the pitch axis con-
trol law are executed in parallel using the N-VERSION CONTROLLER 11 shown in Fig-
ure 1. This CONTROLLER relies on the technique of n-version programming to detect
program errors. (N-version programming, first widely publicized by Avizienis 18 and
recently examined by Knight, Leveson, and St. Jean 19 involves n programmers
independently coding the problem from the same specification). All program outputs
are compared pairwise during this testing. Whenever an output inequality occurs which
is outside the range specified, the testing is halted, and the faulty implementation is
identified, analyzed, and corrected. Using n-version programming for error detection
avoids reliance on a comparisonversion to determine output correctness.
The N-VERSION CONTROI.L,ER simulates the execution of the pitch axis control
system and provides both dynamic and static viewing of the system behavior through an
interface program. The CONTROLLER can be used to control the pitch axis simulation
for combinations of the followingconfigurations:
• Extensively Tested System (ETS) flying
• N-Version System (NVS')flying
• ETS monitoring NVS flying.
These configurations can have noise added to the pitch commands generated and to the
aircraft response in pitch.
3.2. Test Initialization
3.2.1. Pitch Command Generation
The pitch command waveform selected to test the control law software _ be trro-
pogated as either a sine wave or a generalized square wave. The sine wave is of the
form
I](t) = Asin(Bt+_/) + k
where 13,A, B, ",/,and k are parameters specified by the experimenter. The generalized
square wave has six specifiable parameters which characterize the waveform; 1: lead
time, 2: rise time, 3: duration, 4: fall time, 5: height, and 6: vertical displacement. The
sine waveform is denoted by sine ( A,B,_/,k ) and the square waveform is denoted by
square (1,2,3,4,5,6).
For the purpose of this study, the coefficientsof the input square wave and the sine
wave are chosen to have a maximum rate of change in pitch of 30 degrees over 40
timesteps or 2 millisecs. These requirements yield a square waveform of square
(20,40,20,40,60,-30) and a sine waveform of sine (30,.16,0,0) as shay in Plots 1 and 2
respectively.
The noise which can be added to the pitch command and the pitch feedback is sam-
g'_..Lq:0 and a trlmcated
pied from a truncated skewed Normal (i,l,cr_) distribution with o'_
IJ,2
skewed Normal (l_2.cr_)distribution with _ _:0 respectively.
yTo,odvooiool, I  i,ch
I+
b,
Pitch N-Version_,t Elevator Pitch
' CommandGenerator "_-+ _--, (Flying)/ Deflection Response
FIGURE 1. CONFIGURATION OF TH_ N-VERSION CONTROI r _R
where
0c(n) - Pitch command at time step n for the E'rs aS(n) - Deflection of elevator at time step n for NVS
and NVS SYSTEMs prior to the addition of flying the aircraft after voting and prior to
random noise, appl(cation of the elevator transfer fmx-xion.
Rt(n) - Random noise added to 0c_.). Aaron(n) - Difference between a_(n) and aM(n)
_c(n) - Pitch command at time step n for the E'I'S Aam'(n) -Difference between a"c(n)and aF(n)
and NVS SYSTEMS after the addition of ran- a_(n) - Ddlect_on of elevator at time step n for ETS
don noise, flying the aircraft after application of the eleva-
_V(n) - Defle_'tlon of elevator at time step n for ETS tor transfer function.
flying the aircraft prior to application of the a_(n) . Deflection of elevator at time step n for NVS
elevator transfer function, after application of devator transfer function.
a_(n) . [x-n_ctionfdevatorattime,tepnfarver- ._'(n) -Differ='c.ebe_ _(n) and_(n)
sfon i of NVS prior to vote and application of
devator transfer function. O_(n) - Pitch of aircraft at time step n for the ETS
flying the aircraft prior to adding random
aM(n) . Deflo:tion of elevator at time step n for the noise.
ETS monitoring the NVS prior to application of
the elevator transfer function. 0_(n) - Pitch of aircraft at time step n for the NVS
flying the aircraft prior to adding random
Aai_eC(n)- Differerx:e between /_U(n) for all tmordered noise.
rqVS pairs (i.e. (a,_(n),a,_(n)) for all i, j
[0,2]). R2(n) - Rara:k_ noise added to 0_ and 0K at time
A_i"qF(n)- Difference between ai_(n) for all NVS pairs step n.
(i.e. (a_(n),aV(n)) for all i • [0,2]). _(n) - Pitch of aircraft at time step n for the ETS
A_'_(n) for all NVS pain (i.e. (a_C(n)t._n)) for all i • flying the aircraft after adding randona noise.
[0,2]). - Difference between a_'(n) _(n) - Pitch of aircraft at time step n for the NVS
flying the aircraft after adding ranckma noise.
PLOT 1. SQUARE (20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Time Step t
PLOT 2. SINE (30,.16,0,0)
Tune Step.t
3.2.2. Tuning the N-VERSION CONTROLLER
Tuning the N-VERSION CONTROIJ.ER involved (i) testing of the ETS module in
conjunction with the aircraft response model, (ii) testing the control law software written
by programmer 1 in conjunction with the aircraft response model, and Off) testing of the
NVS in conjunction with the aircraft response model. The first two test efforts were
conducted as the ETS and the independent implementations of the control law are imple-
mentations of different forms of the same control law algorithm in that the ETS control
law does not have the mode switching capability and it operates in Proportional-
Integral-Derivative mode only. The above testing resulted in near optimal performance
of the software to control the pitch axis by setting of the aircraft response model coeffi-
dents as follows:
a I = 17.5; ot2 = 39.4; a 3 = 17.0;
131= 1.02; 132= 7.01; 133= 18.7; 134 = 8.6; 135= 2.84;
3.2.3. Tuning the NVS Control Law Coefficients
The control law coeffidents were tuned to minimize the amount of overshooting and
undershooting of the pitch response in the absence of input and feedback noise when the
NVS is flying the aircraft. Table 1 shows the results of executing the NVS system with
different values of the control law parameters for the square (20,40,20,40,60,-30) and
sine (30,.16,0,0) waveforms. The values shown are estimates derived from visual
inspection of the corresponding graphs. Plots 3 and 4 show the system performance for
the tuning runs using the square (20,40,20,40,60,-30) and sine (30,.16,0,0) waveforms
respectively. The ETS control law was tuned during the system tuning runs.
PLOT 3. TSO4 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE PLOT 4. TSN3 SYSTEM PERFORMANCE
Pitch Command vs NVSPitch Reslxx_e Pitch Commandvs NVSPitch I_e
"q'0. "4'0
?.o. ?.0
_" Z<
-20 -20.
Pitch Command vs NVS Pitch Resfxxase PitchCommand vs NVS Pitch Response
q'0. "4"0.
v '0. _ O. "
Z< z<
-4 (] -4 0
-'to 0 _0 -40 0 40
0c(n) Oc(n)
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TABLE 1. NVS CONTROL LAW RUNS OF LENGTH 1,000 INPUT CASES
high freq. _dUation in ON,
tsql .1300 .167 .084 .042 (-180,180) (-300,300) (-200200) (-30,30) overshoot_8_
changessire every time step
high freq. €_dIlation in 8_
tsq2 .0CA) .167 '.042 .021 (-30,30) (-200,200) (-50,50) (-20,20) changes sign alter, time steps
low freq. esdllation in O_
tsq3 .000 .167 .021 .042 (-200,200) (-500,500) (-200,200) (-110,110) changessign every time step
low freq. osdllation in O_
uq4" .000 ,167 .021 .042 (.7,7) (-125,125) (-32,35) (-7,10) at peak and low amp/itude
J
low freq. c_dllation in ON
tsq5 .000 .167 .010 .021 (-i0,10) (-200,200) (-29,29) (-6,8) at peak and low amptitude
low freq. oxci'!ationin ON
tsq6 .000 .167 .1205 .021 (-10,10) (-200,2130) (-29,29) (-6,8) at peakand low art_itude
low freq. o_cillationin oNtsq7 .000 .200 .013 .025 (-10,10) (-200,200) (-35,33) (-10,10) at _ and low amt:fitude
[ _[ low freq. osdllation in 8'_
tsq8 .000 .200 .006 ._ (-10,10) (-200,200) (-32,33) [ (-8,10) at peak and low an_irude
A I 1] I
unl .000 .167 .025 .042 (-12,12) (-75,75) (-27,30) (-6,7) I_ freq. osdllafion
('undershot-is8H !( .
tsn2 .000 .200 .013 j .0_ , (-12,12) (-75,75) (-25.28) (-6,,) i)noosdllationi .: [
I il over ho0p, i
tsn3 " .000 .167 I .042 .0_ i] (-10,10) (-50,50) (-32,M) (-7,9) lc_v freq. _cillation )r
where
t
tsql through tsq8 are the square wave tuning runs
tsnl through tsrd are the sine wave tuning runs
a_, a!, a2, a3 are the control law coeffidents
_ is the current error in 0 at time step n for NVS flying the aircraft.
F_6"_ is the cummulative error in pitch of NVS at time step n.
0/_' is the pitch of aircraft at time step n for the NVS flying the aircraft prior to
addingrandom noise.
E_ is the deflection of elevator at time step n for ETS flying the aircraft prior to
application of the elevator transfor.
9
Based on the results of the tuning runs, the control law coefficients for the square
wave stress test runs were set at a0=O.O00; a1=0.167; a2=0.032; a4=0.084; (based on
tuning run tsq4) and for the sine wave stress test runs a0=O.O00; a1=0.167; a2=0.021;
a3=0.042; (based on tuning run tsn3).
3.3. Stress Test Results
Stress testing entailed executing the system in Pr0portional-Integral-Derivative
(PID) mode 7 (see Appendix A) with the goal of detecting software failures under worst
case input conditions. The noise distributions used during this testing were selected to
simulate both continuous turbulence and discrete incremental gust loads. The stress test
runs were made with the square waveform and the sine waveform and with and without
input noise on the pitch command and the pitch response as depicted in Table 2. Plots 5
and 6 show the signal and noise to signal ratio for the square (20,40,20,40,60,-30) and
sine (30,. 16,0,0) stress test runs respectively.
During the stress tests if the absolute range of the pairwise comparisons of all 8_
exceeded the limit specified, the N-VERSION CONTROLLER logs the system state for
the next two hundred test eases inclusive of the failure causing case. The control law
implementations are then scrutinized for the presence Ofa software fault and the impact
of that fault on the system performance is analyzed.
PLOT 5. SQUARE WAVE RESULTS PLOT 6. SINE WAVE RESULTS
(Signal -_ .No!_),3ignal for _% Additive l.npu: No;.._e (Signal + No[se)/Signnl for 25% Additive L'lput Noise
1
.
_, I '_ _'_
._1 .;_01 . . . , ,
0 _0 :00 DO 200 0 _) 100 l_ 2C0
"l"tmeStep t Time Step t
(Signal . NoL_e),'Signalfor 10% Additive Input Noi._ (Signal + Noi._)/Sigmd for 10% Additive Input NoL_
,,, +
-2 " _ ._ ,
0 .'-3 :."2 I_ 200 _ 100 I_0 2'30
"['tmeStep t Time Step t
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TABLE 2. STRESS TEST RUNS OF LENGTH I,CCY0,000INPUT CASES
IRma R1(n) rlL(n) r1_n) _(n) r2L(n) r2y._n)l C_
ssqI N(O.O,O.O) 0.0 0.0 N(O.O,O.O) 0.0 0.0 0% inl_ & _tputnoise
i
ssq 2 [ N(3.0,1.0) 2.0 i 4.0 N'(0.0,0.0) 0.0 0.0 10%intxtr noLsei
ssq3 N(0.0,0.0)0.0 0.0 N(3.0,1.0) 2.0 4.0 10% _rputndse
i I
ssq4 N(3.0,I.0) 2.0 4.0 N(3.0,1.0)2.0 4.0 10%input& outputnci.,e
ssq5 N(7.52..5) 5.0 I0.0 N(0.0,0.0)0.0 0.0 _% inputncise
ssq6 IN(0.0,0.0)0.0 0.0 N(7.5,2.5)5.0 10.0 25% outputnoise
I
'.. ssq7 N(7.5_.5) 5.0 10.0 N(7.5,2.5)5.0 I i0.0 _%input & outputnoise
Ii
ssnI [ N(0.0,0.0)0.0 0.0 N(0.0,0.0)0.0 0.0 0% inputnoiseoutput noisel
, [ Jssn 2 : N(3.0,1.0) [ 2.0 4.0 N(0.0,0.0) 0.0 0.0 10%input noisei p ri i
t ssn 3 N(0.0,0.0) 0.0 0.0 N(3.0,1.0) 2.0 4.0 10% out-_t noisei
I
+ 1i,+,I
ssn 5 N(7.5,2.5) 5.0 10.0 N(0.0,0.0) 0.0 0.0 25% input noise
ssn6 iN(0.0,0.0) 0.0 0.0 N(7.5,2.5)5.0 I0.0 _% out-putnoise
ssn7 iN(7.5,2.5)5.0 I0.0 N(7.5,2.5)5.0 i0.0 _% input& outputndse
i, I. I
I!
Table 3 shows the maximum range in the elevator deflection angles computed by
each implementation of the control law software for the various stress test runs.
Although the actual values of the elevator deflections varied among the independent
implementations they remained in a range of 2.5, as shown in Table 3, which was speci-
fied as an acceptable performance parameter during the system tuning runs. The range
specification is somewhat arbitrary in that a tight bound on the range increases the rate
with which we observe false alarms, and a lenient bound increases the probability of
non-detection.
TABLE 3.
APPLICATION TASK ELEVATOR
COMMAND DIFFERENCES AND PITCH RANGE
RUN ID MAX DIFFERENCE PITCH RANGE
ssq 1 0.6 [-31.7,34.3]
ssq 2 0.6 [-31.7,37.2]
ssq 3 0.6 [-35.0,34.8]
ssq 4 0.6 [-34.7,40.4]
sscl 5 0.7 [-34.0,48.8]
ssq6 0.5 [-45.1,44.1]
ssq 7 0.6 [-39.9r55.7]
ssn 1 0.7 [-32.1,34.2]
ssn 2 0.7 [-33.6,39.6]
ssn 3 0.7 [-36.4,36.6]
ssn 4 0.8 [-37.4,43.0]
ssn5 1.3 [-39.2,56.2]
ssn 6 1.3 [-49.5,48.8]
ssn7 2.0 [-51.7,66.1]
3.4. Case Analysis Results
Since we were uncertainifthe range in elevator deflection commands were a func-
tion of mismodeling or if a software error was occurring, (This al_aears to be a common
problem with performance testing of process control software.) zu we investigated the
elevator deflections for 1000 time steps by executing the NVS system using the ssql run
parameters, setting the permissible range of the elevator deflection commands computed
by the three implementations for each time step ( i.e., ASh(n) ) to 0, and analyzing the
test case when non-zero ranges occurred. The analysis identified four faults in an imple-
mentation of the control law, as shown in Table 4. The fault made in computing the
derivative term in Modes 4 and 7 was corrected. A re-execution of the ssql run resulted
in numerical agreement (to the least significant bit) of the elevator deflection command
output from the control laws.
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TABLE 4. DESCRIPTION OF SOFTWARE FAULTS
PRESENT IN AT3
Modes Correct Term
Effected Term Used
Oc(n)-OA(n) 6c(n)-6A(n)4,7 t(n)-t(n- 1)
6c(n)-- 0A(n ) 6c(n)-- 6C(Ia-- 1)-- 0A(n)-- 6A(n-- 1)
5,8
t(n)- t(n- 1) t(n)- t(n- 1)
3,6,9 0c(n)--0A(n ) 0c(n)-6A(n)
t(n)-t(n-1)
0c(n)- 6A(n) 6c(n)-- 0A(n)-- 6c(n-- 1) + 6A(n-- 1)
6,9
t(n)-t(n-- 1) t(n)-- t(n-- 1)
where
n is the time s:ep index
t(n) is the clcxk time at step n
0c(n) is the pitch command at step n
0A(n ) Is the actual pitch of the aircraft at step n
0c(n) is the change in pitch command, i.e. (0c(n)-0c(n-1))
0A(n) Is the change in actual pitch, i.e. (0A(n)--0A(n--1))
AT3 Is the third implementation of the control law
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4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
N-version testing of three implementations of a PA28 pitch axis control law with
over 14 million pitch commands (about 78,000 flight hours) having varying levels of
additive input and feedback noise surfaced only four software faults in an implementa-
tion, thus precluding the analysis of software error bursts. This small number of
detected faults may be due to the overly simple example chosen for the control law
software and the programmers' ability to exploit this simplicity in validating it. As
software components of the flight control systems increase in functionality and complex-
ity, the full implication of software errors remains to be seen.
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Appendix A. Pitch Axis Control Law Specification
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1. BACKGROUND
a. Aircraft Control Surfaces And Axes Of An Aircraft In Flight
Aircraft control surfaces are divided into two groups; primary and secondary. The
primary control surfaces are the ailerons which are located at the trailing edge of the
wings, the elevators which are located at the rear portion of the horizontal tail assembly
(in some aircraft the entire horizontal tail is movable), and the ruder which is the rear
portion of the vertical tail assembly. The secondary control surfaces are the trim tabs,
balance tabs, and servo tabs. They are used to reduce the force required to activate the
primary control surfaces, and for trimming and balancing the airplane in flight. These
tabs are ia actuality small airfoils attached to,; or recessed into the trailing edge of the
primary control surfaces.
There are three axes about which an aircraft rotates about whenever it changes its
altitude with respect to the earth, or inertial, or moving axis coordinate system. These
axes are the longitudinal, lateral, and vertical axes. Roll is motion about the longitudi-
nal axis. This motion is controlled by the ailerons. Pitch is motion about the lateral
axis. This motion is controlled by the elevators. Yaw is motion about the vertical axis.
Yaw is controlled by the rudder.
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The above diagram illustrates the axes of an aircraft in flight. Tile set of rectangu-
lar axes is oxyz where o is the center of gravity of the aircraft.
Ox is the longitudinal axis
Oy is the lateral axis
CYzis the vertical axis
U, V, W are the velocity components of the center of gravity along (_x, "O-y,and (_z
respectively.
P, q, r are the components of angular velocity of the axis frame Oxyz about (:Yx,(_y,
andOz respectively. Hence, p is the aircraft's angular velocity in roll, q is the
aircraft's angular velocity in pitch, and r is the aircraft's angular velocity in yaw.
b. Flight Dynamics
1. Eqns. of Motion
Flight dynamics deals with the motion of an aircraft under the influence of forces.
These forces are of six types.
(i) Inertia forces, arising from the mass distribution and linear and angular
acceleration of the aircraft.
(ii) Aerodynamic forces and moments, depending on angular velocities of the air-
craft (sometimes called rotary forces and moments).
(iii) Aerodynamic forces and moments depending on the linear velocities of the air-
craft (sometimes called static forces and moments, since they depend on tile alti-
tude of the aircraft relative to the airstream and not on its angular velocities).
(iv) Aerodynamic forces and moments due to the application of controls (usually
only the forces and moments due to control deflection are of importance; these are
sometimes called static forces and moments due to controls).
(v) Gravitational forces, and
(vi) Propulsive forces.
The equations of motion of an aircraft can be completely determined by considering
these forces. These equations constitute a set of non-linear differential equations, which
are separated with respect to the lateral and longitudinal axes ann linearized. These
equations can be found in texts on aircraft aerodynamics.
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2. STABILITY
A dynamical system is said to be stable or possess stability, if, when slightly dis-
turbed from a state of equilibrium or steady motion, it tends to return and remain in
that state, the disturbance acting for only a finite time. In general, an aircraft must be
both statically and dynamically stable. An aircraft has static stability if, immediately
on being disturbed, it has a tendency to return to equilibrium conditions. An aircraft
has dynamic stability if its motion subsequent to the initial disturbance is characterized
by its decreasing amplitude as equilibrium is restored. Static stability is prerequisite to
dynamic stability. The design of an aircraft must make it both statically and dynami-
cally stable with respect to the three axes. Because symmetry keeps translation and
rotation in the vertical plane from producing forces in the other planes, longitudinal and
lateral-directional stability are considered separately.
To illustrate, assume that we are interested in the stability in pitch for three air-
crafts. Stability in pitch represents longitudinal stability, i.e., stability about the air-
planes' lateral axis.
CL I AirplaneA
Coeffi ci ent)
L__! ' kJ
[ I I Airplane Airplane axis
I Nose-up C B
.I Gust applied
I to aircraft
01
Timet
NOTES: Airplane A is unstable and continually diverges.
Airplane B is both statically and dynamically stable, but the return to equili-
brium takes too long.
Airplane C is acceptable because it returns to equilibrium in a relatively short
time.
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c. Artificial Stability and Automatic Control
The stability and response characteristics of an aircraft without automatic control,
at a given speed and altitude, are determined completely by the design and distribution
of mass of the aircraft. There exists, however, various mechanisms to optimize the
aircraft's stability without changing the aircraft design. One way is by shifting the
ma.ss distribution, or center of gravity during various stages of flight (e.g.,shifting from
subsonic to supersonic speeds). Another way is by automatic control of the control sur-
faces in a manner which compensates for one or anore components of the flight distur-
bance. The goal for both these methods is to artificially improve the stability and
response of the aircraft.
The automatic control systems utilized may be an open-loop systems in which
input data, say 0 i are fed into a servo-system which produces an output 0 0. e i could
be a signal from a gyroscope or an accelerometer. The output 0 0 might represent an
elevator deflection• The automatic control system may be a closed-loop system or a sys-
tem with feedback control. Closed-loop systems are applied in cases where the output
of the open-loop system depends upon the deviation of the aircraft from the datum
state. The essential requirement of a closed-loop system is that the error between the
desired state and the existing state is constantly monitored.
This describes the detailed computer program specifications for the Pitch Axis Con-
trol Problem. It is anticipated that you will code at least three successive control stra-
tegies of increasing complexity. In order, these are:
STRATEGY FORM
(I) Proportional: y--a 0 + al x
(2) Proportional-Derivative: Y--_a0 + alx + _ dx/dt
t
(3) Proportional-Integral-Derivative: Y=% + alx + a2.dx/dt + a3fx dt
0
where Y and the integral are to be computed, and the terms in x and the ai are
inputs. Specifications generally pertinent to all 3 control strategies and details of the
first are contained herein; details for strategies 2 and 3 will be forthcoming. The over-
head (parameter lists, common blocks, clock calls, initialization, etc.,) developed in the
coding of strategy 1 will be directly applicable to strategies 2 and 3. Therefore,
appropriate editing techniques should expedite development of 2 and 3.
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3. SPECIFICATIONS
Language: FORTRAN
Variables: Standard FORTRAN Rcal*4 and Integer*4 for variables passed via
common. Variables may be named as desired.
Module: A subroutine named PROB2 with no parameter list (as in PROB1,
Launch Interceptor Problem).
I/O: Variables will be passed through labeled common blocks; PROB2 will
generate no read/write operations except as necessary during develop-
meat. There should be no I/O operations in the delivered module.
Files: The source code for PROB2 and any supporting subprograms should
be in a file named prob2.for; any other subprograms or main "driving"
programs not delivered should be maintained on separate files.
Acceptance: There will be no formal acceptance test as there was in the Launch
Interceptor Problem; you may generate your own test data as you
desire.
Data Validity: Assume all input data are valid; no validity tests are necessary.
#
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INPUTS: COMMON/INPUTS/
POSITION NAME TYPE GOMMENTS
1 Initialize 1.4 IF -- 1, zero-out all output
variables and return.
2 Mode 1,4 IF --- 0, automatic control is not in
effect; return without computing;
otherwise, determines the control
strategy and the measurement
variable.
3 t(n) 1,4 The current value of dimensionless
time.
4 Oc(n) R*4 Desired value of pitch at current
time-step, n.
5 CA(n) R,4 Actual pitch of aircraft at current
time-step, n.
6 (_c(n) R*4 Desired pitch rate at current time-
step, n.
7 CA(n) R*4 Actual pitch rate of aircraft at
current time-step, n.
8 ai R*4 Coefficients; i -- 1,2,...,5
OUTPUTS:
COM:MON/OUTPUT/
1 5(n) R*,t Elevator deflection angle, computed.
2 E(n) R*4 Error in measurement quantity (as
determined by mode).
3 AOA/At R*4 Pitch rate, computed.
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Saved variables: COMMON/SAVED/
Note: The saved variable name should differ from the I/O variable name.
POSITION NAME TYPE COMMENTS
1 O¢(n) R*4 Current O¢ ; to become
0¢(n-1) upon next entry of subroutine.
2 5(n) R*4 Current computed elevator deflection; to
become 5(n-I) upon next entry of subroutine.
3 Oh(n ) R*4 Current Oh; to become 0 h (n-l)
upon next entry of subroutine.
4 t(n) 1.41 Current value of dimensionless time; to become
t(n-1) upon next entry of subroutine.
5 Eo(n ) R*4 Current error in O; to become
Eo(n-I ) upon next entry of
subroutine.
6 E6(n ) R*4 Current error in E) ; to become
E6(n-1 ) upon next entry of
subroutine.
7 (_¢(n) R*4 Current 6 c ;to become O¢(n-1)
upon next entry of subroutine.
8 (_h(n) R*4 Current (_h; to become (_h(n-1)
upon next entry of subroutine.
9 Ec o R*4 Cumulative sum of EoAt since
t---0.
i0 EE6 R*4 Cumulative sum of E§At since
t---0.
I The type specification for t(n) was omitted from the specification provided to the pro-
grammem.
° .
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4. ALGORITHMS
In any of the forms, the quantity x represents the measured error, _ , in the quan-
tity being controlled which can be either pitch, O , or pitch rate, O----de/dr. The
quantity y is the output from the controller and represents the aircraft elevator
deflection 5.
The controller will compute x, the measured error. Whether it computes x(O) or
x((_) will depend on the value of MODE. In addition, whether O is furnished as an
input or is to be computed as (O(n) - O(n-1)/At) by the controller, will also be deter-
mined by MODE.
Table 1 shows the control strategy and measured error relationship as governed by
values of MODE.
Table A - Control Law Mode
Strat%_' Error Term
Oc - O.A 6c - e.A AOc AOA
P: Proportional 1 2 3
PD: Proportiona/Derivative 4 5 6
PID: Propor tional/Inte_ral/Derivative 7 8 9
TABLE 1: Control Strategy to be employed and Measui'ed Error to be Computed for
Different Values of MODE
THE FOLLOWING STEPS SHOULD BE CODED:
Strategy 1, Proportional, y -- ao + alx
1. Test Initialize (see INPUTS comments)
2. Test Mode
3. COMPUTE X per mode. If MODE----3, use values saved (in common block) from
previous call of your module.
4. COMPUTE Y using inputs a0 and a l
5. RETURN
Strategy 2, Derivative, y -- _ + alx + a2dx/dt
(Same steps as for Strateg-y 1)
t
Strategy 3, Integral, y ---- a0 + nix + a.2d×/dt + a3fxdt
0
(The same steps should be used as for 1 and 2, but in addition provision should be
made for initialization and computation of the integral as a cumulative sum.)
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Appendix B. Results of Stress Test Runs
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STRESS TEST RUN SSQ1
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveforrn SQ(20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Pitch Command NoLo,e Pitch ResponseNoise
Distribution N(0.0,0.0) Distribution N(0.0,0.0)
Truncation Points [0.0,0.0] TruncationPoints [0.0,0.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
ao=.000 al =-167 a2 =.021 a3=.042
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
a 1 = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
131 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
/_F No [-6.2,11.91
8_ No [-6.8,9.3]
0hF No [-30.8,49.2]
_N No [-31.7,34.3]
Ir_l No 63.0
Ir_NI No 121.o
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
IA_ii_'_[ Yes 0.6
It_5_'l No 7.0
Ins_a:l No 3.1
In_l No 5.0
27
STRESS TEST RUN SSQ2
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SQ(20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Pitch Command Noise Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(3.0,1.0) Distribution N(0.0,0.0)
Truncation Points [2.014.0] Truncation Points [0.0,0.0]
Sccd 1234567808 Sccd 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 a1 = .167 a2 = .021 a3 = .042
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
o:1 = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
13x = 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 [34= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
No [-6.6:1.8]
8_' No [-7.4,9.7]
0AFF No [-31.5,51.0]
()_ No [-31.7,37.2]
[F_.oF[ No 67.0
IE_NI No 138.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
IAa_l y_s 0.6
IAa_'l No 8.o
IAap'rl No 3.2
IAS_I No 5.1
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STRESS TEST RUN SSQ3
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SQ(20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Pitch Command Noise Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(0.0,0.0) Distribution N(3.0,1.0)
Truncation Points [0.0,0.0] Truncation Points [2.0,4.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
ao = .000 a I = .167 a2 = .021 A3 = .042
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
a 1 = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
131 1.02 [32 = 7.01 133= 18.70 134 = 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requireme. nt Enabled Extreme Values
_i_ No [-7.4,11.2]
a N No [-8.4,7.9]
_F No [-34.7,47.4]
6_ No [-35.0,34.8]
I_FI No 57.0
IE_NI No 113.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
IAai_l Yes 0.6
lAa_'l No 8.0
laa_a:l No 3.1
I_aE_l No 4.3
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STRESS TEST RUN SSQ4
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveforrn $Q(20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Pitch CommandNoLle PitchResponseNoise
Distribution N(3.0,1.0) Distribution N(3.0,1.0)
Truncation Points [2.0,4.0] TruncationPoints [2.0,4.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 aI = .167 a2 = .021 a3 = .042
AIRCRAFTRESPONSEMODELPARAMETERS
a I = 17.5 c_2 = 39.4 a3 = 17.0
131 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCEREQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
St No [-8.2,11.4]
/_' No [-9.4,9.5]
0AF No [-34.4,49.3]
_N No [-34.7,40.4]
I_Vl No 6X.0
Iz0NI No 129.0
INEQUALITYCONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
1_5_'_1 Yes 0.6
Izx_'l No 7.5
labial No 3.1
I_1 No 5.3
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STRESS TEST RUN SSQ5
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SQ(20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Pitch Command Noise Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(7.5,2.5) Distribution N(0.0,0.0)
Truncation Points [5.0,10.0] Truncation Points [0.0,0.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0=.000 al =-167 a2 =.021 a3=.042
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
a 1 = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
B1 = 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 B4 = 8.60 t35 = 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
8EF No [-8.5,12.31
8_; No [-10.9,13.4]
0_ No [-32.3,53.7]
0AN No [-34.0,48.8]
I_1 No 77.0
IF-.oNI No 1_.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
It_i_l Y_ 0.7
I_1 No 9.5
IzX_l No 3.3
la_l No 6.6
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STRESS TEST RUN SSQ6
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SQ(20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Pitch Command Not_ Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(0.0,0.0) Distribution N(7.5,2.5)
Truncation Points [0.0,0.0] Truncation Points N[5.0,10.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 a 1 = .167 a2 = .021 a3 = .042
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
oq = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
131= 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
a_: No [-11.o,Io.5]
aN No [-14.0,II.2]
0AF No [-41.9,44.8]
0_' No [-45.1,44.1]
IE_I No 51.0
IEoNI No 102.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
IAai_'l V_s 0.5
l_a_'l No 9.5
It_a_:l No 4.8
lAaz_l No 10.5
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STRESS TEST RUN SSQ7
• TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SQ(20,40,20,40,60,-30)
Pitch Command NoLse Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(7.5,2.5) Distribution N(7.5,2.5)
Truncation Points [5.0,10.0] Truncation Points [5.0,10.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 ai = .167 a2 = .021 a3 = .042
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
aI= 17.5 a2= 39.4 cx3= 17.0
131 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
a_ No [-11.9,12.0]
B_" No [-15.4,16.1]
0mF No [-39.1,54.6]
_N No [-39.9,55.7]
IZ_l No 70.0
IZ0r"l No 140.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
I_ai_'_'l Yes 0.6
IAair'-_'l No 8.0
I_a_l:l No 5.3
IAa_'FI No 11.9
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STRESS TEST RUN SSN1
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SINE (30,.16,0,0)
Pitch Command Noise Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(0.0,0.0) Distribution N(0.0,0.0)
Truncation Points [0.0,0.0] Truncation Points [0.0,0.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 a1 = .167 a2 = .042 a3 = .084
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
a I = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
131 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
5EF No [-4.7,8.8]
/_' No [-6.9,8.1]
0mF No [-29.5,36.8]
0_x' No [-32.1,34.2]
I_1 No 47.0
IE_"I No 54.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
IAsi_'_'l Yes 0.7
IA_I No 1.1
IA_I No 1.3
NTlABEl No 2.7
STRESS TEST RUN SSN2
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SINE (30,.16,0)
Pitch Command NoL_ Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(3.0,1.0) Distribution N(0.0,0.0)
Truncation Points [2.0,4.0] Truncation Points [0.0,0.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
ao = .000 aI = .167 a2 = .042 a3 = .084
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
a I = 17.5 c,2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
fll = 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
S[ No [-5.8,8.7]
_" No [-8.8,9.8]
0AF • No i-30.0,38.6]
O_ No [-33.6,39.6]
Ir_l No 54.0
IZ0NI No 64.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
IA_i'_l Yes 0.7
la_?_'l No 1.4
It_Yl No 1.9
I_Xti_Vl No 4.5
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STRESS TEST RUN SSN3
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveforrn SINE (30,.16,0,0)
Pitch Command Noise Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(0.0,0.0) Distribution N(3.0,1.0)
Truncation Points [0.0,0.0] Truncation Points [2.0,4.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 a I = .167 a2 = .042 a3 = .084
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
a 1 = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 ot3 = 17.0
131= 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
_E No [-6.8,8.2]
5_' No [-9.8,8.3]
_F No [-33.5,35.0]
"N
0X No [-36.4,36.6]
lEVI No 44.0
IE_'_I No 51.0
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
IASi_tl Yes 0.7
la_p_'l No 1.3
IAS_a:I No 2.5
IA_E_I No 5.7
STRESS TEST RUN SSN4
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
"I;EST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SINE (30,. 16,0,0)
Pitch Command Noise Pitch Respon.,mNoise
Distribution N(3.0,1.0) Distribution N(3.0,1.0)
Truncation Points [2.0,4.0] Truncation Points [2.0,4.0]
Sccd 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 al = -167 a2 = .042 a3 = .084
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
oq = 17.5 cx2 = 39.4 et3 = 17.0
131 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134 = 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enablcd Extreme Values
/iF No [-7.1,8.1]
5_" No [-11.3,11.4]
0AF No [-32.3,38.41
0aN No [-37.4,43.0]
131 No 52
IE_'I No 61
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
I_i_l Y_s 0.8
IA_tl No 1.5
IA_I No 3.1
NT[A/SE [ No 7.0
37
STRESS TEST RUN SSN5
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SINE (30,.16,0,0)
Pitch Command NoL*,e Pitch Response NoL*,e
Distribution N(7.5,2.5) Distribution N(0.0,0.0)
Truncation Points [5.0,10.0] Truncation Points [0.0,0.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 a1 = .167 a2 = .042 a3 = .084
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
a 1 = 17.5 ct2 = 39.4 ct3 = 17.0
131= 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
_iEF No [-7.7,10.1]
/iN No [-14.6,17.7]
0AF No [-31.2,45.0]
6N No [-39.2,56.2]
IEoF{ No 68
Ir_NI No 84
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
1,_ii_'?"l Yes 1.3
Izx_'l No 2.2
It_8_a:l No 4.1
la_l No 9.9
STRESS TEST RUN SSN6
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SINE (30,.16,0,0)
Pitch Command NoLse Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(0.0,0.0) Distribution N(7.5,2.5)
Truncation Points [0.0,0.0] Truncation Points [5.0,10.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 al = -167 a2 = .042 a3 = .084
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
aI= 17.5 _2= 39.4 _3= 17.0
131= 1.02 132= 7.01 133= 18.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled" ExtremeValues
/5_ No [-10.2,8.1]
6_" No [-18.0,14.4]
6_ No [-40.1,40.7]
0_ No [-49.5,48.8]
IEoFI No 18.5
IZ4_l No 29.5
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled ExtremeValues
NN
[Abij [ Yes 1.3
It_6_'l No 2.1
[A6['TI No 6.0
,NTIAsgl No 14.2
39
STRESS TEST RUN SSN7
TOTAL CASES EXECUTED 1,000,000
TEST CASE GENERATION
Pitch Command Waveform SLNE (30,16,0,0)
Pitch Command Noise Pitch Response Noise
Distribution N(7.5,2.5) Distribution N(7.5,2.5)
Truncation Points [5.0,10.0] Truncation Points [5.0,10.0]
Seed 1234567808 Seed 9876542464
CONTROL LAW PARAMETERS
a0 = .000 a1 = .167 a2 = .042 a3 = .084
AIRCRAFT RESPONSE MODEL PARAMETERS
ct1 = 17.5 a 2 = 39.4 a 3 = 17.0
131= 1.02 132= 7.01 133= I8.70 134= 8.60 135= 2.84
SYSTEM PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
_E No [-11.o,11.21
5EN No [-22.3,21.9]
(_AF No [-37.1,52.2]
0AN No [-51.7,66.1]
IZorl No 63
IEoNI No 77
INEQUALITY CONSTRAINTS
Requirement Enabled Extreme Values
laai_rl Yes 2.0
laa_'l No 2.5
laa_a:l No 7.7
It_aE_l No 17.4
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